Understanding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Role Before 9/11

This account traces the days leading up to 9/11, focusing on the actions of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the chief architect of the attacks. On August 13, 2001, KSM, known as al-Qaeda’s principal operational planner, applied for an Australian visa using a fraudulent Saudi passport under the alias Abdulrahman al Ghamdi. Although he received the visa, he never used it. On June 23, he also obtained a U.S. tourist/business visa under the same alias and passport.

KSM, a Pakistani national raised in Kuwait, studied in the United States, graduating from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in 1986. He joined the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union, where he met Osama bin Laden. After returning to Pakistan post-Soviet defeat, KSM became an influential figure in various plots, including the 1993 World Trade Center attack and a bombing plot in the Philippines aimed at airliners.

The alias Abdulrahman al Ghamdi proved advantageous, as it remained unexposed after the capture of Ramzi Yousef in 1995. Despite the FBI and CIA’s attempt to capture him in Qatar in 1996, KSM evaded arrest, aided by a tip-off from Qatari officials. Consequently, he was added to the U.S. TIPOFF watch list, yet he seemed to escape broader attention.

Under the radar, KSM educated the Hamburg cell—Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—on operational security and prepared them for their U.S. mission. He managed the financial and logistical planning of the operation up until 9/11.

Surprisingly, on June 23, 2001, KSM secured a U.S. visa using his alias, during a period of heightened terror alerts. Neither immigration officials nor the intelligence community flagged this.

“Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information linking Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) … to Bin Ladin, to terrorist plans to use aircraft as weapons, and to terrorist activity in the United States,” stated a partially declassified Top Secret Joint Inquiry into Intelligence activities related to 9/11.

The Inquiry criticized the intelligence community for not grasping the importance of reports from June 2001 outlining KSM’s role in deploying terrorists to the U.S. and facilitating their activities. The focus remained on locating KSM, rather than examining his role within al-Qaeda. This oversight persisted, with KSM’s involvement in 9/11 surfacing more than a year after the attacks, catching the intelligence community by surprise.